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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TAECIA B. PROWS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Appeal No. 20060273-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18a-l(l)(a) (2003) and UT. R. APP. P. 3(a) provides this 
Court's jurisdiction over this appeal from the Minutes, Post Sentencing 
Judgment/Commitment entered on July 12, 2006 (the "Judgment"), by the Sixth Judicial 
District Court in and for Sanpete County, State of Utah, in this case involving two (2) third-
degree felony convictions from a court of record. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Did the officer have the necessary reasonable suspicion to effectuate a 
felony stop for the alleged burglary? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "We review the factual findings underlying the trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous 
standard." State v. Kohl. 2000 UT 35,1f 9,999 P.2d 7 (quoting State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 
939 n. 4 (Utah 1994)). A trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion is reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Rodriguez-Lopi. 954 P.2d 1290,1292 (Utah Ct.App.1998) {citing 
State v. Contrel. 886 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah Ct.App.1994)). "However, 'the reasonable-
suspicion legal standard is one that conveys a measure of discretion to the trial judge when 
applying that standard to a given set of facts.' " Id. {quoting Pena. 869 P.2d at 939). State 
v. Galvan. 2001 UT App 3291f5, 37 P.3d 1197, (Utah App.,2001). 
ISSUE II: Did the officer have the necessary reasonable suspicion to detain and 
frisk Prows outside the initial traffic stop? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "An appellate court reviews a district court's decision 
concerning the constitutionality of a search and seizure for correctness, applying no 
deference to the district court's legal conclusion." See Statev.Markland. 2005 UT 26, fflf 7-9, 
112 P.3d 507. State v.Rvnhart. 2005 UT 84,1f9, 125 P.3d 938. 
ISSUE IH: Did the officer unlawfully extend the scope of the stop by requesting to 
search the vehicle? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "An appellate court reviews a district court's decision 
concerning the constitutionality of a search and seizure for correctness, applying no 
deference to the district court's legal conclusion." See Statev.Markland. 2005 UT 26, ffl 7-9, 
112 P.3d 507. State v.Rvnhart. 2005 UT 84,1J9, 125 P.3d 938. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. IV 
B. UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 14 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 5, 2003, Taecia Prows ("Prows") was charged by Information with 
Burglary a third-degree felony; Theft, a third-degree felony, Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a class B misdemeanor; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor; and Speeding a class C misdemeanor. R0001 -0002. On May 31,2005, Prows 
filed her Motion to Suppress with Statement of Particularity (the "Suppression Motion"), 
challenging that the officer lacked the necessary probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion 
to stop, investigate, question or arrest Prows. R0135-R0141. On September 23, 2005, a 
hearing was held before Honorable Judge David L. Mower of the Sixth Judicial District 
Court-Manti Division, in and for Sanpete County, State of Utah, on the Suppression Motion. 
R0302. At the end of the hearing Judge Mower denied the Suppression Motion. R0302 at 
pp. 170-171. 
On November 23, 2005, Prows entered a plea of No Contest to the charges of 
Burglary a third-degree felony; Theft, a third-degree felony, specifically reserving her right 
to appeal the Suppression Motion. R0340. On January 25,2006, Prows was sentenced to 
two (2) concurrent 0-5 sentences in the Utah State Prison, the execution of which was stayed 
pending her appeal on the matter, given her concession to certain limitations during the stay 
period. R0341. On July 12,2006 the stay was lifted following a hearing on the matter and 
the trial court entered the Judgment, ordering Prows to the Utah State Prison to serve her 
3 
sentence. R0363. On March 18, 2006, Prows timely filed her Notice of Appeal R0281-
0282. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
The trial court found that Albert Polumbo ("Polumbo") resides in a trailer at the 
campground in the Aspen Hills Subdivision and is employed by a group of property owners 
to be a security guard or watcher or lookout. R0302 at p. 161. Polumbo testified that he had 
lived in Aspen Hills for four (4) years and that he knows the area well. R0302 at p. 38. He 
testified he has an agreement with the owners of the property in and around Aspen Hills and 
the owner of the roads to provide security for them. R0302 at p. 39. 
The court found and Polumbo testified that, on December 3, 2003, at around 2:30 
a.m., he was awake watching television when he heard noises—sounds that he associated with 
a vehicle being stuck in the snow and two (2) four-wheelers being operated. R0302 at pp. 
41, 161. The trial court found, and Polumbo testified, that Polumbo's trailer is about 600 
yards away from Parry's cabin. R0302 at pp. 39, 161. The trial court found that Polumbo 
!Prows challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as it pertains to the Suppression 
Motion. "In order to challenge a court's factual findings, 'an appellant must first marshal all the 
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below.'"Chenv. 
Stewart 2004 UT 82,176,100 P.3d 1177, (Utah 2004), citing Wilson Supply v. FradanMfg. 
Corp. 2002 UT 94 at f 21,54 P.3d 1177. For convenience, Prows' "Statement of Facts" section 
will encompass the marshaling of the evidence for the challenged findings of the Suppression 
Motion, arranging the evidence as it pertains to the oral findings entered by the trial court. 
4 
saw a vehicle moving toward the cabin of Rick [sic2] Parry ("Parry") and, since he knew 
Parry, he approached the cabin. R0302 at p. 161. Polumbo testified that it sounded like the 
noises came from the area between the ski lift and tennis courts, so he got dressed and went 
out to see if he could help. R0302 at p. 41. Polumbo testified that he knows Parry, who 
owns several lots around the tennis courts. R0302 at p.39. Polumbo testified that he went to 
the edge of the tennis courts and stood at the entrance to the road that leads in from Laurel 
Wood Drive. R0302atp.41. 
The trial court found that Polumbo had watched Parry work on the cabin, watching 
Parry come and go. R0302 at p. 161. The trial court found that Polumbo knows Parry and 
bis habits, when he arrives, how he operates, that he turns on the lights and has been working 
on his cabin. R0302 at pp. 161 -162. The trial court found that Polumbo had been to see the 
cabin and knew what kind of tools Parry owns. R0302 at p. 162. Polumbo testified that 
Parry usually turns the lights on first thing when he goes to his cabin to work on it; however, 
as he stood there, he testified that he heard a commotion coming from the direction of Parry's 
cabin, but there were no lights on. R0302 at p.39. Polumbo testified that he spoke with 
either the Sheriff or one of the deputies after they had stopped the vehicle driven by Prows 
and that the officer had indicated to him that it had a "bunch of tools in the back," to which 
Polumbo testified that he then gave a description of Parry's tools to the officer. R0302 at p. 
62. 
2
 Evidence shows that the person who owned the cabin was Kurt Parry rather than Rick 
Parry, as the trial court stated in its findings. 
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The trial court found that Polumbo heard a vehicle approaching Parry's cabin and 
three different people talking. R0302 at p. 162. The trial court found that Polumbo heard 
some words, some he calls cuss words, some that he identified as "help" or "load" or "open 
the garage door." Id. The trial court found that Polumbo heard other noises that he 
associated with items of personal property being loaded into a truck, so around 3:00 a.m. he 
dialed 9-1-1 on his cell phone and spoke with the dispatcher. R0302 at pp. 161-162. 
Polumbo testified that it was unusual for somebody to get stuck up there at 2:30 a.m., and 
that he heard three distinct voices and he knew that it was not Parry. R0302 at p. 42. 
Polumbo testified that he called 9-1-1 and told the Sheriffs department that he thought a 
burglary was in progress at his neighbor's cabin. Id. Polumbo testified that he was 250 
yards away from the cabin on the tennis courts when he contacted the Sheriffs Office. Id. 
He testified that there is reflective light off the snow but that all he could really see was 
shadows and that he kept his distance. R0302 at pp.42-43. He testified he could not see any 
vehicles but that he heard what sounded like items being loaded in a pickup and that is why 
he contacted the Sheriff department. R0302 at p. 43. Polumbo testified that he heard voices 
cussing, the word "help" and "load" and "open the garage door," but that most of the words 
were mumbled. R0302 at pp.61, 67. 
The trial court found that dispatch used the police radio to put out the call. Officer 
Jeff Greenwell ("Greenwell") heard dispatch on the radio and responded to Aspen Hills. 
R0302 at p. 162. Greenwell testified that, on the night of December 3,2006 at around 3:00 
6 
a.m., he was on patrol somewhere in the city of Mount Pleasant when he heard the radio, so 
he responded to Aspen Hills Road. R0302 at pp. 74-75. The trial court found that the 
dispatcher then called Sheriff K.P. Larsen (the "Sheriff") on the telephone. R0302 at p. 163. 
The trial court found that the Sheriff was awakened, got dressed, and headed towards the 
Aspen Hills Subdivision. The trial court found that the Sherriff asked dispatch to call 
Captain Gary Larsen ("Larsen") of the Sanpete County Sheriff's Department. The trial court 
found that dispatch called Larsen, and that Larsen got up, got dressed and headed towards 
Aspen Hills. R0302atpp. 162-163. 
The Sheriff testified that, on the night of December 3,2006, he was home in bed when 
he received a call from the dispatch center in Manti at the Sheriffs Office. R0302at p. 5. 
The Sheriff testified that dispatch told him there was a possible burglary in progress in the 
Aspen Hills subdivision. Id. The Sheriff testified that after he received the call he got 
dressed and proceeded to the Aspen Hills area at the north gate. Id. 
Larsen testified that he was called out to work around 3:10 a.m. or 3:15 a.m. on 
December 3, 2003. R0302 at p.112. Larsen testified that, on that night, dispatch had 
contacted him about a possible burglary in Aspen Hills so he prepared to assist. Id. Larsen 
testified he was heading to Aspen Hills when he heard Greenwell do a " 1060" on the suspect 
vehicle on his radio. R0302 at p. 113. He testified he believed it was around 3:40a.m. or 
3:45 a.m. Id. 
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The trial court found that the Sheriff met Greenwell at a place called the north gate, 
which was locked, and had a short conversation. R0302 at p. 163. The trial court found that 
the Sheriff asked Greenwell to stay at the north gate, while he proceeded to travel back south 
to another road called Parley's Lane, also known as the south entrance. Id. 
Greenwell testified that he met the Sheriff shortly after 3:00 a.m. and that he and the 
Sheriff checked the gate and determined it was locked. R0302 at p. 76. Greenwell testified 
that the Sheriff asked him to remain there and watch to see if anyone came down that way. 
R0302 at p. 76. Greenwell testified that he saw no vehicles come down that road in the ten 
(10) minutes he was observing. Id. 
The Sheriff testified that he got in his truck and went to the north gate at Aspen Hills. 
R0302 at p. 6. He testified that the gate was locked and that he met Greenwell at the gate. 
Id. The Sheriff testified that he indicated to Greenwell that there was another avenue that the 
suspects could come down, which was Parley's Lane. R0302 at p. 7. The Sheriff testified 
he asked Greenwell to remain there in case they came down with a key and could get through 
the gate. Id. The Sheriff testified that when he met up with Greenwell that only information 
he had was that there was a burglary in progress in Aspen Hills and that a vehicle had left the 
scene of the burglary and was proceeding out of Aspen Hills. R0302 at p. 9. The Sheriff 
testified that he understood the burglary to be in the area of the tennis courts. Id. The Sheriff 
testified that when he headed to Aspen Hills he had driven on the Round Hills Road with is 
a county road that connects Mount Pleasant with Fairview on the east side of Highway 89. 
8 
R0302 at p. 10. It runs parallel with Highway 89. Id. The Sheriff testified that he owned 
property in the Aspen Hills area and that he knew the area relatively well. R0302 at p. 11. 
He testified that he asked Greenwell to wait at the gate in case the suspects came back down 
that way and he decided to backtrack and go down Parley's Lane. Id. The Sheriff testified 
that Greenwell remained at the gate and he traveled back down the Aspen Hill Road to the 
Round Hill Road. R0302 at pp. 11-12. The Sheriff testified that he then went to the gate at 
Parley's Lane so that he would be waiting there if the suspects came that way. R0302 at p. 
12. He testified that the gate was about a mile or mile and a half up Parley's Lane. Id. 
The Sheriff testified that he met up with Officer Greenwell at approximately 3:15 a.m. 
and that he only spoke with him long enough to discover that they could not get access 
through the north gate. R0302atp. 13. The Sheriffthen asked him to remain there, and then 
returned and went up Parley's Lane. Id. The Sheriff testified that there another road, that 
is not really a road because its not often used, but that it comes down in between Parley's 
Lane and Aspen Hills Road that ends up back at the Round Hills Road. R0302 at p. 14. The 
Sheriff testified that both the Aspen Hills Road and the Round Hills Road are two-lane gravel 
roads, but that the middle road is not like the others. R0302 at pp. 14-15. The Sheriff 
testified that it was dark at the time of the incident and that he did not see any other 
headlights in Aspen Hills. R0302 at p. 28. The Sheriff testified that the only other headlights 
he saw the whole night were from Greenwell's cruiser. R0302 at p. 30. The Sheriff testified 
that there are only three (3) roads that would lead from Aspen Hills to were the traffic stop 
9 
took place, but that one could have arrived at the point of the stop by coming from Mount 
Pleasant to the west. R0302 at p. 29. The Sheriff also testified that there is a Gravel Pit 
Road that comes in from the west in the same vicinity as Aspen Hills Road, and that one 
could get to the point where the vehicle was stopped by taking the Gravel Pit road. R0302 
at p.30. 
The trial court found that the Sheriff received Polumbo's cell phone number while 
waiting at the south gate, and that he called and had a conversation with Polumbo. R0302 
at p. 163. The trial court found that Polumbo told the Sheriff that he heard things being 
loaded, that he knew Parry and his yellow Dewalt tools, and that he heard words being 
spoken by three distinct voices. Id. At pp. 163-164. The Sheriff testified that Polumbo had 
called dispatch and that he had obtained Polumbo's number from dispatch and contacted him. 
R0302 at p. 23. The Sheriff testified that Polumbo told him he had heard people banging 
around and moving things around, and then Polumbo's cell phone battery went dead. R0302 
at -. 24. Polumbo testified that he did not believe that his cell phone battery had died while 
speaking to law enforcement. R0302 at p. 64. Polumbo also testified that he was not sure 
if he had called the Sheriffs cell phone or if the Sheriff had called him and then he pushed 
last number called on his cell phone, but that the Sheriffs office were the only ones he had 
been having contact with. R0302 at pp. 64-65. Polumbo testified he was not sure which law 
enforcement official contacted him that night Id. 
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The trial court found that the Sheriff saw headlights moving towards the south on a 
road that would have been inside of the Aspen Hills Subdivision, and that the Sheriff was 
contemporaneously on the phone with Polumbo who claimed to hear the vehicle and see the 
lights and stated that it was moving south on a road in the subdivision. R0302 at p. 164. The 
trial court found that Polumbo saw a light-colored pickup or Jeep-type vehicle in the Aspen 
Hills Subdivision and it was the only vehicle he saw. R0302 at p. 168. Polumbo testified 
that he saw the taillights of what he believed to be a light colored small pickup or midsize 
vehicle go down Lodge Drive towards an area called the "airport," but then later clarified that 
he told dispatch this information, not the Sheriff. R0302atpp. 47-48,52. Polumbo testified 
he only saw the vehicle leave the cabin and did not know what road it had traveled on all the 
way out of the Aspen Hills area. R0302 at p. 48. Polumbo testified that he relayed this 
information to the Sheriffs office. R302 at pp. 48-49. 
The Sheriff testified that Polumbo had told him that a vehicle had left the residence 
of the alleged burglary, but did not tell him when, and the Sheriff testified that he could not 
say whether it had been five minutes or thirty minutes. R0302 at pp. 26-27. The Sheriff 
testified that, as he was traveling on Parley's Lane, he could see a vehicle coming south on 
one of the access roads, but that he then lost sight of it before it entered on any of the three 
exit ways. R0302 at pp. 16-17, 30. The Sheriff testified he did not have other knowledge 
about the vehicle at that time. Id. The Sheriff testified that he did not remember if Polumbo 
had given him a description of the vehicle or not by the time their phone conversation ceased. 
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R0302 at p. 35. The Sheriff testified that Polumbo provided the name of the owner of the 
residence that had been burglarized and that it was a Kurt Parry. R0302 at p. 36. 
The trial court found that the Sheriff called Greenwell by radio and said for him to go 
back to the Round Hills Road and go south towards Mount Pleasant to see if he could see a 
vehicle. R0302 at p. 164. The Sheriff testified that he called dispatch and asked dispatch to 
notify Greenwell that he had lost sight of them, and to head back down and see if it had come 
down this other way to access to the Round Hills Road. R0302 at p. 17. 
The trial court found that, from the Aspen Hills Subdivision, you can drive north into 
another subdivision with a locked gate or drive east and get to the Skyline Drive 15-20 miles 
east up the mountain road, which does not go into any towns unless you go north or south 
along its length and then drop back down into either Carbon or Emery Counties or San Pete 
County to get back to a town. R0302 at p. 169. The trial court found that you can leave 
Aspen Hills Subdivision heading west on Aspen Hills Road, which leads to a locked gate, 
or take Parley's Lane out, or another unnamed road, which is apparently very rough. R0302 
at p. 169. In all, there were at least five (5) different exits from the Aspen Hills Subdivision. 
The court found that Greenwell went south on Round Hills Road, saw taillights 
moving away from him, matched the speed, locked the radar, and stopped the vehicle. 
R0302 at p. 164. The trial court found that Greenwell used the phrase "to go 1060," which 
the Court determined meant that he picked up the microphone on the radio in his police 
cruiser and called dispatch, telling them he had stopped a car in a certain location. Id. 
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Greenwell testified that the Sheriff called him on his cell phone, told him that the 
vehicle was leaving the area, and asked him to head towards Mount Pleasant to see if he 
could intercept them. R0302 at p. 77. Greenwell testified that he proceeded south on 
Mountainville Road and observed a set of taillights moving southbound. Id. Greenwell 
testified that he caught up to them, paced them—which meant he matched their speed with 
his vehicle and verified it with radar-and clocked them on radar going 65 miles an hour in 
a forty-five (45) mile per hour zone. Id. He testified it was dark, visibility was good, and he 
saw no other vehicles on the road. R0302 at p. 77. 
The trial court found that Greenwell called dispatch on his radio and informed them 
that he was stopping a vehicle at a certain location. R0302 at p. 164. The trial court found 
that the Sheriff and Larsen heard the call and responded. Id. The Sheriff testified that 
Greenwell had left the north gate and made a vehicle traffic stop in Mount Pleasant. R0302 
at p. 17. The Sheriff testified that he knew about the traffic stop because he heard on the 
two-way police radio that Greenwell had made a traffic stop. Id. The Sheriff testified that 
at that point he proceeded to the traffic stop. Id. 
The trial court found that Larsen pulled in behind GreenwelFs cruiser when he arrived 
at the scene and saw a dark-colored Toyota 4Runner stopped southbound on 900 East and 
Mount Pleasant. R0302 at pp. 164-165, 168. The trial court found that Larsen observed 
Greenwell standing behind the open door of his police cruiser speaking to the 4Runner, 
observed the driver's door open and Prows exit the vehicle, and observed Greenwell speak 
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again and Prows put her hands up over her head. R0302 at p. 165. The trial court then found 
that Larsen observed Greenwell handcuff Prows, lead her across the street on 900 East, had 
her sit down, then returned to his car. Id. The trial court found that it was now 
approximately 3:40 a.m. Id. 
Greenwell testified that he used his overhead lights to stop the vehicle and it took 
about a block and a half for the vehicle to stop. R0302 at p. 78. Greenwell pursued the 
vehicle as a felony stop because of the report of the possible burglary in progress, the fact 
that there were no other vehicles in the area, and because he would have stopped and treated 
any other vehicle the was traveling the same direction as a felony stop. R302 at p. 95. 
Greenwell also testified he would not have stopped a small passenger car because it could 
not have gotten up the mountain. Id. He testified that he cannot remember if he had any 
information about the suspect vehicle, if he had information that it was an SUV or a small 
truck. R0302 st p. 96. Greenwell testified that, from were he was sitting at the north gate 
that there were no other cars southbound on the Mountainville road and that he had only been 
to the gates of Aspen Hills and never past them. R0302 at p. 97. Greenwell testified that he 
would not know if there were other exits to take from the Aspen Hills Subdivision. Id. 
Greenwell testified he did not approach the vehicle when he removed the driver from the 
vehicle for officer safety. R0302 at p. 107. He testified that he ordered the driver out of the 
vehicle, had the driver step back a ways, and patted the driver down. R0302 at p. 78-79. 
Greenwell testified that he did not ask Prows for her drivers license, registration, proof of 
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insurance, or any questions regarding speeding. R0302 at p.98.Greenwell testified that the 
driver exited the vehicle and he recognized her as Prows. R0302atp. 79. He testified that, 
at this point, Larsen arrived on the scene. R0302 at p. 80. 
Larsen testified that he headed to Greenwell's location to back him up. R0302 at p. 
113. He testified that when he arrived that he observed Greenwell outside of his vehicle and 
that Prows was outside of the suspect vehicle. Id. Larsen testified that he pulled in behind 
Greenwell's cruiser when he arrived on the scene, observing only Greenwell's cruiser and 
a Toyota 4Runner there at the scene. R0302atpp. 114,117. He testified that Greenwell was 
still by his vehicle and the Prows was sitting outside the suspect vehicle on the driver's side. 
Id. The court found that Greenwell went back to his car as Larsen arrived on the scene and 
that Greenwell and Larsen had a conversation. R0302 at p. 165. 
The trial court found that, after Prows was sitting on the side of the road, Larsen and 
Greenwell approached the vehicle and smelled alcohol coming from the vehicle. R0302 at 
p. 167. The trial court found that Larsen went to the passenger side of the vehicle and spoke 
to passenger Williams. Id. The trial court found that Larsen removed Williams from the 
vehicle, noticed the handle of a large fixed-blade knife, asked Williams, "I'm going to look 
for weapons. Is that okay?" and received consent from Williams to do so. Id. The trial court 
found that Williams was then handcuffed and taken back to the front of Greenwell's car and 
told to sit on the ground. Id. Greenwell testified he believed that it was about 3:20 a.m. 
when Williams was removed from the vehicle. R0302 at p. 84. 
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Greenwell testified that permission was obtained to search the vehicle, R0302 at p. 
85. Greenwell also testified that he did not hear Larsen ask for consent but the Larsen told 
him consent had been given to search at the scene. R0302 at p. 101. He testified that only 
15-20 minutes had passed since the beginning of the stop when permission was granted to 
search. Id. 
Greenwell testified that, upon returning to the vehicle from having placed Prows on 
the side of the road, he smelled alcohol coming from the vehicle. R0302 at pp. 80-81. 
Greenwell testified that once Larsen arrived that they both approached the vehicle and had 
the passenger, Williams, in front seat step out of the vehicle. R0302 at pp.80-81. Greenwell 
testified that he knew there were passengers in the vehicle because he could see the top of 
their heads with his headlights. R0302 at p. 81. He stated that, when Larsen arrived that his 
cruiser was about 100 feet from the suspect vehicle and that he was in front of his cruiser. 
Id. Greenwell then testified that he walked up to the driver's side of the vehicle and Larsen 
walked up to the passenger side of the vehicle and ordered Williams out of the vehicle. Id. 
Greenwell testified that there were two (2) passengers in the car. Id. Greenwell testified that 
Larsen handcuffed Williams and set him on the ground in front of his Cruiser. R302 at p. 
83. Greenwell testified that he could not recall to which one of the male passengers the car 
was registered. R302atp.85. 
Larsen testified that after he arrived at the scene he talked to Greenwell who told him 
that there were two (2) other suspects in the vehicle. R0302atp.ll4. Larsen told Greenwell 
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to watch the other two (2) and that he would get the front passenger out. R0302 at p.l 15. 
Larsen testified that he then proceeded to the area on the suspect vehicle with his firearm out 
because it was a felony stop. Id. Larsen testified that he had Williams get out of the vehicle 
and that he was a tall and slender person. R0302 at p. 115. Larsen also testified that he 
observed a knife protruding from under the front seat as the passenger stepped out. Id. 
Larsen testified that after Williams got out that he searched him and handcuffed him and 
brought him around the front fender of the vehicle because there was still one occupant 
inside and Larsen wanted some protection. Id. Larsen testified that it was sometime at the 
scene before he learned that it was Williams' vehicle. R0302 at p. 131. 
The trial court found that, after removing Williams, Larsen and Greenwell then went 
back to the rear door of the driver's side and removed Wendler from the vehicle, similarly 
handcuffing him and having him sit on the ground. R0302 at pp. 165-166. Larsen testified 
that he and Greenwell removed Wendler from the vehicle just as the Sheriff arrived and that 
they used his handcuffs to handcuff him. R0302 at p. 118. Greenwell testified that after 
handcuffing Williams, Larsen ordered Wendler out of the vehicle, walked him back, and got 
the Sheriffs handcuffs and put him in his cruiser. R0302 at p. 83,99. Larsen also testified 
that, as he searched Wendler, he asked him if there were any other weapons in the car, to 
which Wendler replied there was not. R0302 at p. 117. Larsen testified that he was going 
to look in the vehicle and the occupant agreed. Id. He testified that he then took the suspect 
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and set him down in front of GreenwelPs police cruiser. Id. He testified he could not see 
Prows at this time because of her location across the street. Id. 
Greenwell testified that the Sheriff pulled up as they were removing the third suspect. 
R0302 at p. 83. He testified that, during this time, Prows was sitting on the ground on the 
opposite side of the road about 30 feet from the vehicle. Id. The vehicle had been traveling 
south and Prows was sitting on the other side of the road from the vehicle. R0302 at p. 84. 
Greenwell testified that Larsen pulled up behind his cruiser and that he could not recall, but 
believed that the Sheriff pulled up behind Larsen. Id. 
The Sheriff testified that Greenwell and Larsen were removing the third individual, 
Wendler, from the vehicle when he arrived and that they used his handcuffs to handcuff him. 
R0302 at pp. 19-20. The Sheriff testified that, when he arrived at the scene that there was 
a female and one (1) male in handcuffs and a third individual was being removed from the 
vehicle. R0302 at p. 21. The Sheriff testified that the female was to the side of the suspect 
vehicle on ground about thirty (30) feet from the vehicle, because there was no curb. R0302 
at p. 32. The Sheriff testified that he did not participate in the arrest of Prows and that he did 
not hear any of the officers tell her she was under arrest. R0302 at p. 35. The Sheriff 
testified that he was not sure where the first male suspect was situated and that the second 
male suspect was just being removed from the vehicle. R0302 at p. 35. 
The trial court found that, upon arriving at the scene, the Sheriff spoke to Larsen and 
Greenwell and told them he had a conversation with Polumbo in which he learned that they 
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were to look for tools that were yellow that may have been taken from the Parry residence. 
R0302 at p. 166. The trial court found that, in the process of opening the rear door, the 
officers saw a blue tarp covering the yellow tools. R0302 at pp. 165-168. 
Greenwell testified that, as he approached the vehicle, he could see the very back of 
the vehicle and the back seat and that it had a lot of tools and power tools and hand tools in 
it. R0302 at p. 82. Greenwell testified that the way the tools were stacked in the car 
appeared to be out of the ordinary as they were just thrown in the car. R0302 at p. 82. He 
testified there were quite a few tools but he could not estimate how many. Id. 
Polumbo testified he had not told dispatch about the tools. R0302 at p. 62. The 
Sheriff testified that when he contacted Polumbo, Polumbo told him that there was a large 
number of tools at the Parry residence, and that tools may have possibly been taken from the 
residence. R0302 at p. 24. The Sheriff testified that he relayed this information to the other 
officers. Id. Polumbo testified that whomever he spoke with told him they had already 
stopped a vehicle with tools inside it-referring to the stop of the 4Runner-and that this was 
when he told them that Parry had a lot of yellow Dewalt tools, to which law enforcement told 
him that those tools must be from the cabin because they were all yellow. R0302 at p. 62. 
Larsen testified that Parry later identified the tools as his3. R0302 at p. 133. The Sheriff 
testified that the tools were found on and behind the second seat of the vehicle. R0302 at 
p. 34. He testified that the tools were hand tools, saws, drills. Id. He testified that there 
3
 Testimony elicited from the Sheriff in the preliminary hearing shows that nearly half of 
the tools located in the 4Runner at the time of the stop belonged to Williams. 
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were cordless and cord-type power tools like drills, saws, and all types of hand tools. R0302 
atpp.34-35. 
Larsen testified that upon the Sheriffs arrival, he informed them that there was a high 
probability that tools had been taken from the cabin in Aspen Hills because he had received 
that information from a witness up on the mountain. R0302 at p. 118. Larsen testified he 
did not notice the tools until they removed Wendler. R0302 at p. 119. He testified that he 
observed what looked like a wooden platform with tools protruding from underneath a blue 
tarp, what appeared to be larger power tools. Id. 
The trial court found that, from the moment that Greenwell arrived on the scene, none 
of the occupants of the vehicle were free to leave. R0302 at p. 166. The trial court found 
that no one ever informed the occupants they were under arrest or words to that effect, but 
that there was no requirement for officers to say any specific phrase. Id. Greenwell testified 
that the occupants were not under arrest, but were not free to go, based on the investigation 
going on. R0302 at p. 86. Greenwell testified that, at the moment of the search, no one was 
under arrest, but the investigation was ongoing and no one was free to leave. R0302 at p. 98. 
The trial court found that, during the search of the vehicle conducted by Greenwell 
and Larsen subsequent to the request for consent made by Greenwell to Williams, the officers 
located a pipe in the glove compartment, and a tin can in a bag. R0302 at pp. 166-167. 
Greenwell testified that the suspects had not been transported away at the point of the search. 
R0302 at p. 100. Greenwell testified that he was on the passenger's side and that Larsen was 
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on the driver's side when they started their search. R0302 at p. 86. Greenwell then testified 
that he looked in the glove box for the registration and found a pipe with marijuana residue 
on it. R0302 at pp. 86-87. Greenwell testified that a large, fixed-blade knife was found under 
the passenger seat, and power tools, saws and drills, were found in the back of the vehicle. 
R0302 at p. 87. Greenwell testified that an open can of beer was also found in the front of 
the vehicle and that the vehicle smelled of alcohol. R032 at pp. 87-88. Greenwell testified 
that the open can was discovered during the first part of the search of the vehicle, which was 
approximately 20-25 minutes after the traffic stop was made. R0302 at p. 100. Larsen 
testified that, because they had received consent from Williams, he and Greenwell searched 
the vehicle and discovered the marijuana pipe, and a black and red tote bag with two pipes 
inside. R0302atp. 120 He testified the bag was discovered in the back seat area. R0302 
at p. 121. 
The trial court found that, after speaking with the Sheriff and handcuffing Wendler, 
Larsen placed Williams and Wendler in his car, read them their Miranda rights, and began 
asking them questions. R0302 at p. 168. The trial court found that both Wendler and 
Williams gave confessions and implicated Prows in participation of the removal of things 
fromParry's cabin. Id. Larsen testified that, afterthe search, he put Wendler in his patrol 
vehicle and interviewed him after advising him of his Miranda rights. R0302 at p. 121. 
Larsen testified that Wendler told him they had been up on the mountain and had gotten their 
vehicle stuck, so Wendler and Williams went to a garage at a cabin in the mountains and took 
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two(2) four-wheelers and a tow strap to assist in pulling their vehicle out. R0302 at p. 122. 
Larsen further testified that Wendler told him once they were unstuck that he and Williams 
drove the four-wheelers back to the cabin while Prows followed in the vehicle. Id. Larsen 
testified that, after they got back to the cabin, they went through a basement window to open 
up the garage and they loaded up the tools from the garage into the truck. Id. Larsen 
testified that Wendler told him all three (3) of them participated in loading the tools. R0302 
at p. 123. Larsen testified that, in the interview with Williams and Wendler, they accused 
each other of kicking the boards off of the basement window. R0302 at p. 131. Larsen 
testified that, at that point, the suspects were being detained and were not free to leave. Id. 
Larsen further testified that he told both male suspects in his patrol car that they would be 
taken to jail as the investigation continued and that they would be taking the vehicle . Id. 
Greenwell testified that Wendler was placed in Larsen's cruiser. R302 at p. 85. 
Greenwell testified that, after the search of the vehicle was complete, Larsen went back and 
talked with Williams, stood Prows up, and walked to the front of the vehicle. R0302 at p. 
88. Greenwell testified he read her Miranda rights to her and asked her what was going on. 
Id. Greenwell testified that Prows told him that they had gone for a ride in the mountains and 
got stuck, and that she had fallen asleep in the vehicle. Id. Greenwell testified that Prows 
informed him that, when she woke up, the two passengers had come back with a bunch of 
tools and two (2) four-wheelers. Greenwell testified that Prows admitted to driving the 
vehicle. Id. Greenwell described Prows as having glassy eyes, slurred speech, smelling of 
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alcohol, and that she reported being cold. R0302 at pp.88-89. Greenwell testified that he had 
Prows go back to his cruiser and write a statement as to what she had told him. R0302 at p. 
89. Larsen testified that Prows admitted in her written statement to being the driver of the 
vehicle going into Aspen Hills and leaving Aspen Hills. R0302 at p. 131. 
Larsen testified that Chief Wilberg ("Wilberg") got out of bed and came to transport 
Williams and Wendell to the jail and that Greenwell transported Prows. R0302 at p. 125. 
The Sheriff testified that Wilberg arrived on the scene to help with the transportation of the 
suspects to the jail. R302 at p. 31. Greenwell testified that Wilberg conducted field sobriety 
tests on Prows at the Sheriffs office. R0302at p. 99. 
Greenwell testified that an incident impound on the vehicle was warranted because 
of the alcohol, drug paraphernalia, and the investigation of a burglary. R0302 at p. 91. 
Larsen testified the Wilberg and the Sheriff took the 4Runner to be held at the city shop as 
evidence. R0302atp. 125. Greenwell testified that the vehicle was transported to the public 
works yard because it was a secured area to conduct the inventory instead of the middle of 
the road. R0302 at p. 90. The Sheriff testified that Officer Kenny ("Kirkham") of the 
Sanpete County Sheriffs Office helped with the inventory of the vehicle. R302 at p. 31. 
He also testified that after the suspects were transported he assisted Larsen with the inventory 
of the vehicle. R0302 at p. 22. The Sheriff testified that he, Larsen, and Kirkham took an 
inventory of the vehicle and that they had discovered hand tools, power tools, and drug 
paraphernalia in the vehicle. R0302 at p. 33. He testified that the drug paraphernalia was 
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discovered in the console and that the hand tools were discovered in the rear of the vehicle. 
Id. Greenwell testified that he arrested Prows for DUI the next afternoon at the jail but 
did not know if anyone else had arrested her. R0302 at p. 98. Greenwell testified that be 
believed he issued a speeding citation to Prows later at the jail as part of her DUI citation. 
R0302 at p. 109. Greenwell testified that Prows was dressed in winter clothing and he did 
not smell alcohol on his first approach of the vehicle Id. Greenwell testified he noticed the 
smell of alcohol when he approached the vehicle with Larsen on the driver's side. R0302at 
p. 99. Greenwell testified that the driver's window was rolled down but the door was not 
open. Id Greenwell testified he did not smell alcohol on Prows when he first approached 
her because they were outside and had a slight breeze. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
[Shopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' 
within the meaning of [the Fourth and Fourteenth] Amendments, even though 
the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief. 
Delaware v.Prouse. 440 U.S. 648,653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 
(1979); accord State v. Strickling. 844 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah App.1992); see, 
Terrv v. . 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) 
(defining Fourth Amendment seizure as '^ whenever a police officer accosts an 
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away"). 
State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1276, (Utah App.,1994.) 
In the instant matter, Greenwell lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to effectuate 
a felony stop on the vehicle driven by Prows based on the limited information he had that a 
possible burglary had taken place. He had no information other than that when he performed 
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the stop, did not receive any information until later on, and the alleged burglary was not 
confirmed to have actually occurred until the next afternoon. 
Because Greenwell had no reasonable suspicion to effectuate a felony stop on the 
vehicle driven by Prows in connection with the burglary, he had no reasonable articuable 
suspicion to detain her past what would have been necessary in relation to the speeding 
violation. Greenwell had no evidence at the time he detained Prows to support any 
involvement in the alleged burglary, and no verification that a burglary had actually occurred. 
Greenwell also lacked the necessary suspicion to extend the scope of the stop by requesting 
that he be allowed to search the vehicle. 
Having violated Prows right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the 
denial of the suppression motion in this matter should be reversed and the matter remanded 
for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FINDINGS DO NOT SUPPORT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
AS TO THE SUPPRESSION MOTION IN THIS MATTER 
UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) states that "[a] party challenging a fact finding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Recently, this Court has 
held that "[m]arshaling evidence in support of the ultimate finding is a prerequisite to a 
challenge to it." Parduhn v. Bennett. 2005 UT 22, 112 P.3d 495. This Court defined the 
marshaling requirement, stating that "specifically, our marshaling rule requires plaintiffs to 
'marshal all the evidence in favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then demonstrate 
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that even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings of fact.'" Save our Schools v. Board of Educ. Of Salt 
Lake Citv. 2005 UT 551[10,122 P.3d 611 citing Chen v. Stewart 2004 UT 82 f76,100 P.3d 
1177. As the Utah Court of Appeals has determined, marshaling is "[a] critical requirement 
of appellate advocacy" when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. West Valley City 
v. Hoskins. 2002 UT App 223, 51 P.3d 52. 
[T]he challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the challenger resists, and after constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence 
which must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that court's finding 
resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Id. "Marshaled facts in an appellant's brief should correlate particular items of evidence with 
the challenged findings, supporting the findings with all available evidence in the record, and 
only then should appellant attempt to demonstrate how the challenged findings are clearly 
erroneous." Neelv v. Bennett. 2002 UT App 189, 51 P.3d 724, cert denied, 59 P.3d 603. 
"Parties challenging factual findings must fully embrace the adversary's position and play 
devil's advocate." Parduhn v. Bennett. 2005 UT 22, 112 P.3d 495. 
Prows has adequately marshaled the evidence herein under the "Statement of Facts" 
supra. Several of the findings of the trial court in this matter appear viable upon first look; 
however, a closer look shows that the evidence comes close to the findings, but does not rise 
completely to fully supporting them. 
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The trial court found that Polumbo saw a vehicle moving toward the Party cabin and, 
since he knew Parry, he approached the cabin. R0302 at p. 161. No evidence was elicited 
during the trial in this matter respecting Polumbo seeing anything, particularly a vehicle 
moving towards the cabin. Additionally, no evidence exists that Polumbo approached the 
cabin. The closest Polumbo got to the cabin was 250 yards, a significant distance, 
particularly in adequately hearing what is happening. Polumbo did not witness things the 
way the trial court found that he did. 
The trial court found that the Sheriff was contemporaneously on the phone with 
Polumbo who claimed to hear the vehicle and see the lights and stated that it was moving 
south on a road in the subdivision. R0302 at p. 164. The trial court uses this bridge to say 
that Polumbo saw the car leaving while he was on the phone with the Sheriff, then the Sheriff 
saw the same car coming, then called Greenwell when he lost sight of it and Greenwell 
pulled it over. The evidence, however, was not so precise and, in fact, did not create such 
a bridge. The Sheriff could not remember if he got a description of the vehicle from 
Polumbo, and did not know whether the vehicle had left the cabin five minutes prior to 
talking with Polumbo or thirty minutes prior. The Sheriff said that Polumbo's cell phone 
died while he was talking to him, but Polumbo did not remember this happening. 
The reliability of Polumbo's information weighed heavily in this case towards the 
suppression of the evidence challenge. In its findings, the trial court created bridges in the 
evidence which appear on their face to be minimal; however, their impact is substantial on 
the determination to deny the suppression motion. If there was no nexus between the car 
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Polumbo saw and the car that the Sheriff saw, it becomes questionable that it is the same 
vehicle. If the trial court believed the erroneous idea that Polumbo had heard the car 
approach and decided to approach the cabin, it could very well have placed more credibility 
with Polumbo than it should have. The trial court may have erroneously determined the 
suppression motion based on the fact that it believed Polumbo witnessed the entire instance 
from the time the vehicle approached until it left. This is clearly not supported by the 
evidence. 
Additionally, if the trial court believed its findings, then it would have to believe that 
Polumbo approached the cabin and heard what he testified to at a close proximity. Polumbo 
testified that he never approached the cabin, that it was their policy not to place themselves 
or anyone else in the subdivision in danger, and that he stayed a safe 250 yards away at all 
times. This could likely have carried a substantial prejudice in the outcome of the 
suppression motion. Many of the trial courts findings are based upon believing that Polumbo 
heard what he heard. 
Absent these findings, there is little evidence as to the inception of the encounter 
between Prows and law enforcement. The trial court erroneously entered findings which 
appear to be minimal but carry a substantial risk that the credibility determination of a main 
prosecution witness was erroneous. This Court should reverse the denial of the suppression 
motion and remand the matter for a new trial free from erroneous findings that have potential 
affect upon the findings as a whole as happened with this matter. 
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O. NO REASONABLE SUSPICION EXISTED TO EFFECTUATE A 
FELONY STOP WITH RESPECT TO THE ALLEGED BURGLARY 
"[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within 
the meaning of [the Fourth and Fourteenth] Amendments, even though the purpose of the 
stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 
653,99 S.Ct. 1391,1396,59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); accord State v. Strickling. 844 P.2d 979, 
982 (Utah App.1992); see Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,16, 88 S.Ct. 1868,1877,20 L.Ed.2d 
889 (1968) (defining Fourth Amendment seizure as "whenever a police officer accosts an 
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away"). State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1276, 
(Utah App.,1994). "A stop is justified if there is a reasonable suspicion that the defendant 
is involved in criminal activity." State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1276, (Utah App.,1994), 
citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (1990); see also, State v. Carpena. 714 P.2d 674, 675 
(Utah 1986) (per curiam) (stating police must base reasonable suspicion on objective facts 
indicating defendant's criminal activity). "While the required level of suspicion is lower than 
the standard required for probable cause to arrest, the same totality of facts and circumstances 
approach is used to determine if there are sufficient 'specific and articulable facts' to support 
reasonable suspicion." Case,supra, citingTmz> 392 U.S. at 21,88 S.Ct. at 1880; see United 
States v.Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1,7-8,109 S.Ct. 1581,1585,104L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); accord State 
v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App.1994); Strickling. 844 P.2d at 983. 
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. In Latta v. Keryte. our 10th Circuit Court of Appeals undertook an analysis of an 
investigative detention and its compliance with the Fourth Amendment by determining as 
follows: 
"[w]e must determine whether the officer has reasonable suspicion to detain 
the individual. [Teirv v.Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-80, 20 
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)]. Reasonable suspicion "requires considerably less than 
proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, but something more 
than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch." United States v. 
Melendez-Garcia 28 F.3d 1046, 1051 (10th Cir.1994) (internal quotations 
omitted). The officer must be "able to point to specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant that intrusion." Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
Ibid., 118 F.3d 693, 699, (C.A.10 (NUM.) 1997). 
In the instant matter, it is conceivable to believe that Greenwell had reasonable 
suspicion to pull Prows over for speeding since, as he testified, he had registered her going 
20 miles per hour over the posted speed limit. R0302 at p. 77. However, Greenwell did not 
pull Prows over for speeding, but instead pulled her over because her vehicle was the only 
vehicle coming down the road and he had a report of a suspected burglary occurring up the 
mountain near the Aspen Hills Subdivision. Greenwell could have very well effectuated a 
traffic stop for speeding, but he did not. Instead of stopping the vehicle and approaching the 
vehicle to ask for driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance, he instead stopped the 
vehicle and ordered Prows out of the vehicle. 
Greenwell testified that he used his overhead lights to stop the vehicle and it took 
about a block and a half for the vehicle to stop. R0302 at p. 78. Greenwell pursued the 
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vehicle as a felony stop because of the report of the possible burglary in progress, because 
there were no other vehicles in the area, and testified he would have stopped any other 
vehicle going that direction because of the reported burglary. R0302 at p.95. Greenwell 
testified that, from were he was sitting, there were no other cars that were southbound on the 
Mountainville (Round Hills) road and that he had only been to the gates of Aspen Hills and 
never past them. R0302atp.97. Greenwell testified he ordered the driver out of the vehicle, 
had the driver step back, and patted the driver down. R0302atp.78-79. Greenwell testified 
that he did not ask Prows for her drivers license, registration, proof of insurance, or any 
questions regarding speeding. R0302 at p 79. 
Based upon his testimony it is apparent that Greenwell did not intend to stop Prows 
for speeding, but only on his hunch that this vehicle was involved in a suspected burglary that 
had been unverified at the time the stop was effectuated. At the time of the stop, Greenwell 
possessed no information that would allow him to effectuate a felony stop on the vehicle 
driven by Prows. The reported alleged burglary had been called into dispatch by Polumbo. 
However, Polumbo did not speak directly to Greenwell, but to the Sheriff. Greenwell also 
testified that he intended to stop anyone who was heading that direction, no matter who they 
were. If Greenwell intended to stop anyone who came through the area just because they 
were in the area, he was in essence establishing a checkpoint to check any and all vehicles 
for criminal activity. 
In Citv of Indianapolis v. Edmond. the United States Supreme Court discussed the 
purpose of checkpoints and under what circumstances they may be used, as follows: 
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The rule that a search or seizure is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
absent individualized suspicion of wrongdoing has limited exceptions. For 
example, this Court has upheld brief, suspicionless seizures at a fixed 
checkpoint designed to intercept illegal aliens, United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte. 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116, and at a sobriety 
checkpoint aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road, Michigan Dept. of 
State Police v.Sitz. 496 U.S. 444,110 S.Ct. 2481,110 L.Ed.2d412. The Court 
has also suggested that a similar roadblock to verify drivers1 licenses and 
registrations would be permissible to serve a highway safety interest. Delaware 
v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660. However, the 
Court has never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was 
to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Pp. 451-453. 
Ibid, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 449, (U.S. Ind. 2000). Greenwell was not authorized to 
effectuate a stop, particularly a felony stop, on any and every vehicle that drove by for the 
purpose of detecting whether the occupants were involved in a suspected burglary or criminal 
wrongdoing. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Huguenin. 154 F.3d 
547, 555 (6th Cir.1998) stated that, "We believe that the danger inherent in pretextual 
roadblocks is the potential for giving police the authority to stop every car on the road, 
question its driver and passengers under the guise of a legitimate traffic-related purpose, and 
then claim enough reasonable suspicion through, for example, the driver's expression or 
answers, to conduct a more thorough search of the stopped individuals and vehicles ••• with 
insufficient limitations on police discretion.5' State v. DeBoov. 2000 UT 32 [^24. 996P.2d 
546. Greenwell was doing nothing more than intending to stop every vehicle that went by 
in the hopes of finding the suspects of the alleged unverified burglary. He was establishing 
a checkpoint in order to check for ordinary criminal wrongdoing, which is contrary to the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Edmond. as set forth more particularly above. 
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The information received by the Sheriff from Polumbo must also be considered based 
upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether enough reasonable suspicion 
existed. In State v. Saddler. 2004 UT 105, [^11, 104 P.3d 1265, the Utah Supreme Court 
discusses the totality-of-the-circumstances standard as set forth in Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 
213,103 S.Ct. 2317,76 L.Ed.2d 527, rehfg denied, 463 U.S. 1237,104 S.Ct 33,77 L.Ed.2d 
1453 (1983) as used to determine probable cause and informant reliability. 
We have recognized that an informant's "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" 
are but two relevant considerations, among others, in determining the existence 
of probable cause under "a totality-of-the-circumstances." They are not strict, 
independent requirements to be "rigidly exacted" in every case. A weakness 
in one or the other is not fatal to the warrant so long as in the totality there is 
substantial basis to find probable cause. The indicia of veracity, reliability, and 
basis of knowledge are nonexclusive elements to be evaluated in reaching the 
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances, there 
is a fair probability that the contraband will be found in the place described. 
State v. Hansen 732 P.2d 127,130, (Utah, 1987) {quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 
230,233-34,103 S.Ct. 2317). 
In the instant matter, the information given by Polumbo did not rise to the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to stop the vehicle for investigation due to the alleged burglary. First, 
Greenwell is the officer who effectuated the felony stop, however, he had no information 
from Polumbo at the time the stop was made. The only evidence presented as to GreenwelPs 
knowledge at the time of the stop was that an alleged burglary had occurred in Aspen Hills, 
and that a vehicle was heading down the mountain. Greenwell was not provided any 
descriptions as to the alleged individuals involved, the alleged vehicle involved, what was 
possibly stolen in the alleged burglary, or any other descriptive information on which to rely 
to base his reasonable suspicion supporting the illegal stop of the vehicle driven by Prows. 
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Even armed with the more descriptive information that Greenwell obtained later from 
the Sheriff after the felony stop had been effectuated, it still did not support the requisite 
reasonable suspicion to effectuate a felony stop. Greenwell and Larsen had two of the three 
occupants out of the vehicle and not only detained, but restrained in handcuffs prior to the 
Sheriffs arrival on the scene, where he only provide information that the informant thought 
that tools may have been stolen. This remained still unverified by any witness, even 
Polumbo, who was simply guessing that this is what he heard. 
Not only did Greenwell lack the necessary information, but the information Polumbo 
gave the Sheriff or dispatch does not meet the totality-of-the-circumstances criteria under the 
Gates test. Polumbo testified that his trailer is approximately 600 yards from the Parry cabin, 
that he was 250 yards away while speaking with the police on the phone. Polumbo stated 
that he heard three (3) distinct voices at the cabin, but did not actually see or observe 
anything or anyone. Since it was 3:00 a.m. and dark outside and Polumbo was 250 yards 
away, he could only hear what was happening in the vicinity of Parry's cabin. Additionally, 
Polumbo thought the vehicle was a small pick-up based only on his hearing what seemed to 
be loading of items into the back of it. Polumbo also thought the vehicle was possibly a light 
color because of how the snow reflected the light, but he was not sure he had given the police 
this information. 
During the entire illegal felony stop, detention, seizure and search in this matter, it was 
never established by any officer that a burglary had actually taken place. Polumbo never 
actually saw anything occur, he only heard noises coming from that general direction, but 
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deliberately kept his distance. The noises Polumbo heard could have been just as easily 
associated with their having gotten stuck in the snow and attempting to pull themselves out. 
Polumbo never actually observed any kind of crime being committed and law enforcement 
never established that a burglary had been committed prior to effectuating a felony stop of 
the vehicle driven by Prows. 
Based upon the totality-of-the-circumstances standard, the information obtained from 
Polumbo is not only insufficient, but he could not even be sure what he heard was a burglary, 
as it was dark and he only heard noises from that general direction. He never saw nor 
specifically heard Prows. He also could not identify the vehicle other than to say that it was 
a light-colored small pickup or Jeep-type vehicle, when the vehicle driven by Prows was a 
large, dark-colored SUV. 
The vehicle's lights that the Sheriff saw and told Greenwell to follow could have been 
anyone coming down the mountain. There is no evidence to support the trial court's 
erroneous finding that the Sheriff and Polumbo were seeing the exact same vehicle while on 
the phone together. The Sheriff himself said he did not receive information from Polumbo 
as to how long ago the vehicle had left the area of Parry's cabin. However, he erroneously 
immediately suspected the first set of vehicle lights he saw, and continued to observe those 
until he lost sight of it in the oaks, then radioed dispatch to tell Greenwell to look out for it. 
R0302 at p. 17. No evidence was submitted as to what make or model the vehicle was that 
was observed by the Sheriff, nor any evidence supporting the idea that the vehicle driven by 
Prows was the vehicle observed by either the Sheriff or Polumbo. The necessary nexus is 
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substantially flawed to support the totality of the circumstances Gates test to prove the 
reliability of the information received from the informant to support the felony stop 
effectuated by Greenwell on the vehicle driven by Prows. 
The information from Polumbo was insufficient based on the totality-of-the-
circumstances because he was not sure that what he was hearing was what had occurred and 
he was incapable of giving any descriptive details to law enforcement about the exact vehicle 
or exactly what had occur. Nevertheless, any information he did relay was only relayed 
directly to the Sheriff and no evidence was submitted to support the idea that Greenwell had 
any requisite knowledge to effectuate a felony stop of the vehicle driven by Prows. The 
Sheriff did not relay even the minimal descriptive information to Greenwell until after he had 
performed the felony stop. Therefore, Greenwell lacked the reasonable suspicion to stop the 
vehicle based on the alleged burglary because he had no reliable information or indication 
that Prows was actually involved in the alleged unverified burglary. All evidence obtained 
by the officers as it pertains to this matter that flowed from the illegal felony stop effectuated 
on the vehicle driven by Prows should have thus been suppressed, and the trial court violated 
Prows' rights by denying her suppression of this evidence. 
HI. OFFICER GREENWELL VIOLATED PROWS' RIGHT TO BE FREE 
FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES BY 
STOPPING AND FRISKING PROWS. 
In its landmark case ofTerrvv.Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,21,88 S.Ct. 1868,20 L.Ed.2d 889 
(1968), the United States Supreme Court undertook an extensive and greatly detailed analysis 
as to an individual's rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as guaranteed 
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by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. More particularly, Terry v.Ohio 
pertained to a case in which an individual was stopped and frisked by a police officer while 
walking down the street. The United States Supreme Court stated as follows: 
It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and 
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person. And it is 
nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful 
exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body 
in an attempt to find weapons is not a 'search,9 Moreover, it is simply fantastic 
to urge that such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the 
citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a 'petty 
indignity.' It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may 
inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be 
undertaken lightly. 
Terrv v.Ohio, 392 U.S. at 16-17,88 S.Ct. at 1877. After undertaking a lengthy analysis, the 
United States Supreme Court determined that, as it pertained to Terry, there could be no 
question that Terry was 'seized' and subjected to a 'search' when the officer took hold of him 
and patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing, an interference with Terry's personal 
security. Terrv v.Ohio . 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. "[I]n determining whether the 
seizure and search were 'unreasonable' our inquiry is a dual one-whether the officer's action 
was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry v.Ohio. 392 U.S. at 
19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. 
As argued more particularly above, Greenwell's actions were not justified at their 
inception. At the time of the illegal stop, Greenwell had no verification that a crime had 
actually occurred, had an unreliable witness who was speculating as to sounds he heard and 
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who had not even attempted to verify them with his own eyes, had no description of a 
potentially involved vehicle, and was unaware as to what may have been stolen. The 
officer's actions clearly were not justified at their inception in this matter. 
Should this Court determine that GreenwelPs actions in stopping Prows were 
somehow justifiable, either under the traffic violation or some alternative analysis, it is clear 
that Greenwell was not justified in ordering Prows from the vehicle and patting her down. 
These actions exceed the permissible scope of a traffic stop, as argued further below, and 
required a reasonable articulable suspicion that a further illegality has occurred. However, 
as stated supra, there was no reasonable suspicion that Prows was involved with the reported 
and unverified burglary. If Greenwell was justified in stopping Prows based on the traffic 
violation, Greenwell's actions could not have been reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. 
Thus, Greenwell violated Prows' Fourth Amendment rights to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures when he ordered her from the vehicle and patted her 
down without the requisite reasonable suspicion to do so. The trial court's denial of Prows' 
suppression motion should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. 
IV. NO REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION EXISTED TO 
DETAIN PROWS PAST THE INITIAL TRAFFIC STOP 
This Court recently undertook an analysis as to an individual's Fourth Amendment 
rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, recognizing that a traffic stop 
results in a temporary detention, which detention has limitations, as follows: 
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"To determine whether a search or a seizure is constitutionally reasonable, we 
must first determine whether the officer's action was ' justified at its 
inception."' "State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446,450 (Utah 1996) (quoting State 
v.Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1132 (Utah 1994) (additional citation omitted)). "If 
so, we then consider whether the resulting detention was' "reasonably related 
in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place." 
' " Id (citations omitted). "[A] traffic stop is justified at its inception when 
'the stop is "incident to a traffic violation committed in [an officer's] 
presence."' " State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125, f 30,63 P.3d 650 (alterations in 
original) (citations omitted). Moreover, "during a traffic stop an officer 'may 
request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, 
and issue a citation.' " Id. at f 31 (quoting Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1132) 
(additional citations omitted). " ' "Any further temporary detention for 
investigative questioning after [fulfilling] the purpose for the initial traffic 
stop" ' constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has probable cause or a 
reasonable suspicion of a further illegality." Id. (quoting State v. Godina-Luna. 
826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (alteration in original) (additional 
citations omitted)). 
State v.Despain, 2003 UT App 266 f 7, 74 P.3d 1176. 
If this Court were to determine that Prows' rights were not violated by the felony stop 
effectuated by Greenwell upon her or the frisk undertaken immediately upon pulling her over 
and ordering her from the vehicle, the stop still cannot stand as constitutionally sound as it 
pertains to the protection of Prows' rights. Greenwell also lacked the required reasonable 
articuable suspicion to detain Prows outside the scope of the supposed traffic stop. 
Greenwell turned on his overhead lights after following Prows for a distance, pulling 
her over to the side of the road. Greenwell then ordered Prows from the vehicle and, without 
any questioning, patted Prows down, handcuffed her and placed her on the side of the road 
30 feet from the vehicle. Greenwell never "fulfilled the purpose of the initial stop" if he 
stopped her for speeding. He never requested a driver's license, vehicle registration or 
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conducted a computer check. Greenwell did not even issue a citation until possibly later that 
afternoon, when he claims he arrested her for a DUI charge relating to this matter4. Clearly, 
Greenwell was effectuating a felony stop based on the reported alleged burglary. If he was 
justified in executing the stop based upon the allegations of speeding, he clearly lacked the 
reasonable suspicion of further illegality to detain Prows further, particularly in the manner 
in which he did. 
It is important to remember that Greenwell had no information as to a suspect 
description, vehicle description, or any other information, and it had not even been verified 
by law enforcement that a burglary had even taken place when the felony stop occurred. All 
Greenwell knew was that dispatch had received a report of a possible burglary and now he 
was pulling over a vehicle simply because it had been in the area at the time of the alleged 
crime. Law enforcement cannot simply pull over everyone they see simply because an 
alleged crime has occurred in the area. In State v. Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85 (Utah CtApp. 1987), 
a stop based on the lateness of the hour and the high-crime factor in the area was found to 
be unconstitutional because the officer lacked a reasonable suspicion as to Trujillo, the 
individual stopped. See, State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah App 1991). The 
information received from Polumbo had not been relayed to Greenwell when he detained 
4
 The only evidence as to a possible DUI in this matter is that the vehicle smelled of 
alcohol and that they conducted field sobriety tests on Prows at the jail. No evidence was offered 
as to the results of the field sobriety nor any other indications that she may have been intoxicated 
beyond the legal limit. 
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Prows and Polumbo had only told dispatch or the Sheriff what he had heard, because he 
never actually saw anyone remove anything from Parry's cabin. 
In State v.Tehero. 2006 UT App 419 f 6,147 P.3d 506, this Court held as follows: 
"Under our case law, there are three permissible levels of police stops:(l) An 
officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose questions so long as the 
citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about 
to commit a crime; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense had been committed or is being 
committed."State v. Markland. 2005 UT 26,110 n. 1,112 P.3d 507 (omission 
in original) (quotations and citation omitted). A level one encounter is a 
voluntary encounter during which a citizen may choose to answer a police 
officer's questions but is free to leave at any time during the questioning. See 
Salt Lake Citv v.Rav. 2000 UT App 55, Tf 11, 998 P.2d 274. " As long as the 
person remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been 
no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the 
Constitution require some particularized and objective justification.' " Id. 
(quoting State v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765,767 (Utah Ct.App.1990)) (additional 
quotations and citation omitted). In contrast, a person is seized in a level two 
stop, and thus afforded the protections of the Fourth Amendment, when the 
officer by means of physical force or show of authority has in some way 
restrained the liberty of [the] person." (quotations and citations omitted). A 
level one encounter becomes a level two seizure when "a reasonable person, 
in view of all the circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave. 
This is true even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting 
detention brief." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Circumstances 
demonstrating that a level two stop is underway include the presence of more 
than one officer, the display of an officer's weapon, physical touching of the 
person, use of commanding language or tone of voice, and retaining a person's 
identification or other documentation. See id. 
In the instant matter, when Prows was stopped for speeding it should have been a simple 
level one encounter in which she should have provided some document to the officer, been 
cited, had her documentation returned, and been free to continue on her way. However, the 
stop of the vehicle was a level two encounter from the inception. As soon as Prows stopped 
41 
the vehicle, she was ordered out of the vehicle by a commanding tone, and then handcuffed 
and placed on the cold street in the middle of the night. Greenwell himself testified that 
Prows was never free to leave from the moment he stopped her because it was an ongoing 
investigation. R0302atp. 91. 
It is clear this was a level two encounter or detention because more than one (1) 
officer was present, the officers used commanding language or tone of voice when they 
ordered Prows and the suspects out of the vehicle, the suspects were ordered out of the 
vehicle at gunpoint, and there was physical touching of the suspects because Prows was 
physically removed from the vehicle, frisked and then handcuffed. It is clear that this seizure 
of Prows was a level two stop from the beginning and not a level one as a speeding stop. 
Therefore, Greenwell never intended to stop Prows for speeding, but stopped her 
solely for the purpose of investigating an alleged burglary that had not yet been confirmed. 
Because Greenwell had no information or evidence that Prows was the one who was 
involved in the alleged burglary or that one had even occurred, he could only have been 
effectuating a speeding or traffic stop. If the matter was justifiable as a traffic stop, 
Greenwell lacked the reasonable articulable suspicion to detain and seize Prows beyond the 
point of the initial traffic stop. 
Prows was thus unlawfully seized and detained by Greenwell after she was initially 
stopped, in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. The trial court erroneously denied Prows' suppression motion, which should 
be reversed by this Court and the matter remanded for a new trial. 
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V. THE SCOPE OF THE STOP WAS UNLAWFULLY EXTENDED AND 
THE CONSENT TO SEARCH OBTAINED BY EXPLOITATION OF 
THE PRIOR POLICE ILLEGALITY. 
This Court articulated the limitations on detaining individuals for the scope of the stop 
in State v. Chevre. as follows: 
Once a traffic stop is made, the detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.' "Lopez. 873 P.2d at 
1132 (quoting Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 
L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). If there is investigative questioning that detains the 
driver beyond the scope of the initial stop, it "must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means 
suspicion based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of the 
circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop." Id. If the officer 
reasonably suspects more serious criminal activity, "the scope of the stop is 
still limited." Id. The officer must "diligently pursue a means of investigation 
that [is] likely to confirm or dispel [his or her] suspicions quickly, during 
which time it [is] necessary to detain the defendant." 
Ibid 2000 UT App 6, flO, 994 P.2d 1278, citing State v. Grovier.08 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991). This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have undertaken several analyses 
over the years as to the voluntariness of a consent to search in light of an illegal detention, 
creating specific criteria that must be met under a "totality of the circumstances" test, as 
follows: 
When determining whether a defendant's consent to a search of a vehicle 
following an illegal detention was voluntary under the totality of the 
circumstances test, factors which may show a lack of duress or coercion 
include: (1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; (2) the 
absence of an exhibition offeree by the officers; (3) a mere request to search; 
(4) cooperation by the defendant; and (5) the absence of deception or trick on 
the part of the officers. 
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State v.Hansen. 2002 UT 125, ^ [57,63 P.2d 650. This Court specifically addressed this issue 
as it pertained to a request by an officer to search after the scope of the initial stop has 
completed, as follows: 
[0]nce the officer has returned the driver's license and registration in a routine 
traffic stop, questioning about drugs and weapons or a request for voluntary 
consent to search may be 4an ordinary consensual encounter between a private 
citizen and a law enforcement official' so long as a reasonable person under 
the circumstances would believe he was free to leave or disregard the officer's 
request for information. United States v. McKneelv. 6 F.3d 1447,1451 (10th 
Cir.1993) (citations omitted); see State v.Patefield 927 P.2d 665,659 (Utah. 
App. 1996) (holding that after completing traffic stop, determination of 
whether defendant was seized turns on "whether, when viewed under an 
objective standard, someone in [defendant's] position would reasonably have 
felt free to leave"); see also United States v. Lambert. 46 F.3d 1064,1068 n. 
3 (10th Cir.1995) ("While not directly on point — the principle of the traffic 
stop cases, i.e., that an individual's identification should be retained no longer 
than necessary to accomplish the purpose for its request, does apply."). 
Salt Lake Citv v. Rav. 2000 UT App 55, fii 4, 998 P.2d 274. In State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 
684 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court, reversing this Court's holding in State v. Arroyo. 
770 P.2d 153, 155-56 (Utah Ct.App.1989), held that, to be constitutionally valid, a search 
consent following illegal police behavior must be both non-coerced and not arrived at by 
exploitation of the primary police illegality. Factors used to evaluate the non-exploitation 
or attenuation element are derived from Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254,45 
L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), which involved a confession obtained from a criminal suspect after his 
illegal arrest. They include the temporal proximity of the primary illegality and the granting 
of consent, the presence or absence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and 
flagrancy of the illegal police conduct. Arrovo. 796 P.2d at 690-91 n. 4 (citing Brown. 422 
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U.S. at 603-04,95 S.Ct. at 2261-62, and 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(d), at 193-94 
(2d ed. 1987)). 
In the instant matter, stopping the vehicle Prows was driving for speeding did not give 
the officers probable cause to request to search the vehicle. First, neither Greenwell nor 
Larsen knew who the owner of the vehicle was until after the illegal stop was effectuated and 
all occupants restrained and detained. While they claim to have asked and received consent 
from both Williams and Wendler, Prows was the driver and was never questioned as to 
whether they could search the vehicle. 
Additionally, the request to search was testified to by several of the officers as 
justifiable based upon the safety risk imposed by the knife that was allegedly in plain sight 
when Greenwell and Larsen removed Williams from the vehicle. The officers felt they had 
the authority to search based upon a safety concern to them; however, they clearly could not 
have a right to search when possession of a knife is not illegal, nor was there any indication 
that the occupants of the vehicle posed any threats to the officers. The occupants had 
substantially complied with all of the requests made by the officers, whether they were 
justifiable requests or not. 
The officers obviously exhibited a show of force in obtaining the consent to search 
by first having removed and then handcuffing the driver without questioning her as to the 
burglary or the speeding. When they then removed Williams and began to handcuff him 
while asking whether they could search the vehicle for weapons, they were exhibited physical 
force by restraining and detaining Williams. The request was not a mere request to search, 
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and the totality of the circumstances clearly shows that the officers thought they had cause 
and authority to ask to search and exhibited force in obtaining the consent in light of the 
unlawful detention. Hence, the voluntariness of any consent obtained by Greenwell or 
Larsen to search the vehicle is reasonably called into doubt. 
The stop should have only lasted as long as was necessary to take care of the speeding 
violation, and no longer. Greenwell had no reasonable suspicion to hold Prows any longer 
than was necessary for the initial traffic stop, as argued more particularly above. Greenwell 
had no further indications that anything was amiss. He had no other information than the 
idea that there had been a possible burglary, and that had not been verified at the time of the 
search. Also what information law enforcement officers had received from Polumbo at this 
point was based on what he heard because he did not actually observe any kind of criminal 
activity taking place. After stopping the vehicle Greenwell had no further indicators that any 
kind of crime had occurred and therefore, had no probable cause to extend the scope to 
request to search the vehicle. 
Officers are allowed to ask to search a vehicle absent reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause, so long as the encounter remains consensual. Ray at fh. 4. This encounter was not 
consensual at its inception, however. Not only did Prows not feel she was free to leave, but 
both Greenwell and the Sheriff testified that she was not, based on the ongoing investigation 
into the alleged burglary. Prows', Williams' and Wendler's physical restraints by 
handcuffing and detentions evidenced that they would not feel free to leave. The consent 
was requested and obtained under duress or coercion given the circumstances that Greenwell 
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had effectuated a felony stop on the vehicle and the officers had used authoritative tones in 
ordering the occupants from the vehicle and placing them in handcuffs. Clearly the request 
for consent to search the vehicle was not an ordinary consensual encounter between citizens 
and law enforcement and was in violation of their right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. 
The consent to search was obtained through exploitation of the prior police illegality 
pertaining to the stop and the detention or seizure, as set forth supra. State v. Arrovo. 796 
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). It is clear that the temporal proximity of the primary illegality and the 
granting of consent, the presence or absence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose 
and flagrancy of the illegal police conduct support a coerced consent in this matter to search 
the vehicle. Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). The 
stop, seizure and request for consent happened almost immediately in proximity to one 
another. As argued further above, there were no intervening circumstances justifying the 
stop or seizure of the occupants of the vehicle driven by Prows. Williams and Wendler were 
both removed from the vehicle in the presence of several officers and handcuffed without any 
questioning by police. Additionally, any consent obtained was communicated as being in 
search of "other weapons" which they knew there were none in the vehicle. The Brown 
factors are met in this matter to support a coerced consent to search the vehicle. 
In the instant matter, Greenwell stopped the vehicle for speeding, although he did not 
perform any of the usual tasks that an officer would for speeding he had still stopped the 
vehicle for speeding. In order for Williams to have given consent to search the vehicle he 
47 
must have felt like he was free to leave the scene or disregard the officer's request to search. 
He was not free to do either of these things. Greenwell testified that at the point of the search 
no one was under arrest but no one was free to leave either. R302 at p. 91. So Williams 
would not have felt like he was free to go, so the consent to search could not have been given 
voluntarily. Because Greenwell testified that Williams was not free to leave the scene or 
disregard their request, the search was performed without the necessary voluntary consent 
and was therefore illegal. 
Because Greenwell had no information other than that there had been a reported 
burglary, he had no reasonable suspicion to effectuate a felony stop on the vehicle driven by 
Prows. However, should this Court find that he did have reasonable suspicion under the 
guise of the alleged traffic violation, then Greenwell unlawfully frisked and then detained 
Prows outside the scope of the stop. Should this Court find that Prows' detention was legal, 
then Greenwell failed to obtain the necessary voluntary consent to extend the scope of the 
stop and request consent to search the vehicle. Because he did not have the requisite 
reasonable articuable suspicion to stop, detain, frisk or search, any evidence, admissions or 
confessions, obtained as a result of the illegalities perpetrated upon Prows should have been 
suppressed and the trial court's denial of the suppression motion should be reversed and this 
matter remanded for a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Whatefoxe, based upon** foregoing, Pro**Tesp*^yicq^1toibi*ComtT*m 
the Judgment and enter other such orders as this C u^rt deams apf»opfi«t»-
DATKD this 5* day ofFebruary, 20Q7. 
WillinroL. 
Attorney ferTaeciaB. Pwws 
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JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Criminal Number: 031600162 
Judge: David L.Mower 
The above case came before the Court on January 25th, 2006 for sentencing. The 
defendant was personally present and was represented by her attorney, Jim R. Scarth. Brody 
L. Keisel, Deputy Sanpete County Attorney, represented the State of Utah. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted upon a plea of: 
1) Guilty; 3) Not Guilty and a verdict of Guilty; 
X 2) No Contest; 4) Not Guilty and a finding of Guilty; 
•; A K :•> 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
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to the offense(s) of BURGLARY, a Third Degree Felony, and THEFT, a Third Degree 
Felony 
X 1) As charged in the Information. 
2) As charged in the Amended Information. 
The Court asked if the defendant had anything to say why judgment should not be 
pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary was shown or appeared to the Court. All 
other charges are dismissed as long as her no contest plea remains. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that for the offense of BURGLARY, a Third Degree Felony, 
the defendant shall serve a term in the Utah State Prison of0to5 years and is ordered to pay 
a fine in the amount $9.275.00, which includes the Surcharge and the Court Security Fee. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that for the offense of THEFT, a Third Degree Felony, the 
defendant shall serve a term in the Utah State Prison of0to5 years and is ordered to pay a 
fine in the amount $9.275.00, which includes the Surcharge and the Court Security Fee. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the above prison sentences and fines are to run 
concurrently with each other. The execution is stayed and Defendant is released pending the 
outcome of an Appeal, on the following terms and conditions: 
1. Take all prescription medications as directed by your Physician. 
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2. Do not possess or consume alcohol or illicit drugs of any kind or go places where 
alcohol is the chief item of sale or order. 
3. Do not use or possess any drugs without a prescription. 
4. Upon the request of any Peace Officer, submit to a search or seizure of person, home 
or vehicle without the need of probable cause. 
5. Upon the request of any Peace Officer, submit to a sample of blood, breath, or urine 
without the need of probable cause. 
6. Defendant's attorney will file a Notice of Appeal within 30 days from January 25th, 
2006. 
7. If Defendant's appeal fails, the State reserves the right to choose a date to bring 
Defendant back before the Court for commitment. 
8. Be prepared to submit to commitment by March 22nd, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. unless a 
Notice of Appeal has been filed with the Sixth District Court. 
9. The Court reserves jurisdiction over this matter to consider any potential 
modifications. 
10. Be productive by working full time or going to school full time. 
11. Obey all laws in every jurisdiction. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
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RIGHT TO APPEAL 
You have the right to appeal this Judgment and Order by 
of Appeal within 30 days. 
DATED: -£i~ ft& _2006. J-jAvllu, 
DAVID L. MOWER 
DISTRICT COURT 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct unsigned copy of the above and 
foregoing Judgment and Order to the defendant's attorney, Jim R. Scarth, at P.O. Box 160, 
St. George, UT 84770 on the > 1 day of January 2006. 
Secretary 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct signed copy of the above and 
foregoing Judgment and Order to the defendant's attorney, Jim R. Scarth, at P.O. Box 160, 
St. George, UT 84770 on the Q.~? day of fcjfoeu&x^ 2006. 
Secretary 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND ORDER 
Case No.: 031600162 
Judge: DAVID L. MOWER 
On May 26,2005, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress evidence that officers obtained 
from her following Defendant's arrest. Defendant filed a Supplement to her Motion on August 
12,2005. The Court conducted a hearing on Defendant's Motion on September 23,2005. The 
Court now enters its following Findings and Order: 
1. Albert Pulumbo ("Pulumbo") is person who lives at the Aspen Hills Subdivision, 
Polumbo has lived there for the past four years and is employed by a group of 
Aspen Hills property owners to be a security guard or watchman. 
2. On December 3,2003 at or about 2:30 a.m., Albert Pulumbo was at his trailer, 
which was parked in the campground of Aspen Hills Subdivision. At that time 
he was awake and watching television inside his trailer. He heard some noises so 
he exited his trailer and went outside to investigate. 
3. On that date there was snow on the ground in Aspen Hills Subdivision. 
4. While outside, Pulumbo heard sounds that he associated with a vehicle being 
stuck and two four wheelers being operated. Pulumbo also saw a vehicle moving 
toward the cabin of Kirk Peery ("Peery"), which is located about 600 yards away 
from the location of Pulumbo's trailer. Pulumbo was not certain in his 
identification of the vehicle, but did testify that he thought the vehicle was "light 
colored." 
5. Pulumbo knew Peery. On occasions previous to December 3,2003, Pulumbo 
had watched Peery come to Aspen Hillsjand work on the cabin. Not only did 
Pulumbo watch Peery come and go, but he knew Perry's habits when he arrives, 
such as how Perry always turns on the lights when working on his cabin. 
Additionally, Pulumbo has been inside Peery's cabin and knows what kind of 
tools Peery owns. 
6. Pulumbo moved within 250 yards of the cabin where he heard people talking and 
could identify three distinct voices. He heard some words, some that he referred 
to as cuss words, others that he identified as "help" or "load," or "open the garage 
door." Also, Pulumbo heard other noises that he associated with items of 
personal property being loaded into a truck. 
Pulumbo did not enter Perry's cabin prior to speaking with any law enforcement 
officers. 
Next, Pulumbo dialed 911 on his cell phone. The dispatch at the Sanpete County 
Sheriffs Office answered Pulumbo's call. Pulumbo talked to the dispatcher. 
The dispatcher used the radio to contact Officer Jeff Greenwell ("Greenwell"), 
who was patrolling for the Mt. Pleasant City police department. 
Mt. Pleasant City, Utah is a city that is in the north part of Sanpete County. It sits 
at the base of high mountains which are part of the Manti LaSal National Forest. 
The Aspen Hills Subdivision is located at the base of the Manti Lasal mountain 
range, north of the city of Mt. Pleasant, both of which are in Sanpete County. 
After receiving the report at approximately 3:00 am, Greenwell traveled towards 
the Aspen Hills Subdivision. 
Meanwhile, the dispatcher called Sheriff Kay Larsen ("Sheriff Larsen" or 'the 
Sheriff') on the telephone. The Sheriff, who resides in Mt. Pleasant, arose, got 
out of bed, got dressed, got in his police car, and then traveled towards the Aspen 
Hills Subdivision. 
The Sheriff asked the dispatcher to call Captain Gary Larsen (" Capt. Larsen") of 
the Sanpete County Sheriffs Office. The dispatcher did so. At the time of the 
call, Capt. Larsen was asleep at his home in Ft. Green, Utah. Capt. Larsen arose, 
got dressed, got in his car and then traveled towards the Aspen Hills Subdivision. 
13. Three roads lead from the Aspen Hills Subdivision traveling west, or southwest 
towards Sanpete County as drawn on Exhibit #1. The most northern road is 
known as the Aspen Hills Road, which leads to a locked gate, known as the 
"North Gate." The middle road is unnamed, very rough and located on Exhibit 
#1 as a dotted line. The most southern road leading from the Subdivision is 
known as Parley's Lane. The three roads all converge with Round Hill Road at 
their west ends. 
14. Aspen Hills Subdivision may be exited on the north side; however, that road 
leads to another subdivision where at the time of this event there was a locked 
gate. It is also possible to exit Aspen Hills Subdivision on the east, which road 
leads to the Skyline Drive, which is fifteen to twenty miles further east from 
Aspen Hills Subdivision. Such road does not lead to other towns unless one 
travels north or south along the length of the Skyline Drive and then drops down 
into either Carbon, Emery, or Sanpete Counties to get back to a town. 
15. The Sheriff traveled to the Aspen Hills Subdivision and met Greenwell at the 
"North Gate" on the Aspen Hills Road. The gate was locked. They engaged in a 
brief conversation, then the Sheriff asked Greenwell to remain at that Gate. 
16. The Sheriff then traveled south to another road called Parley's Lane, which he 
also referred to as the "South Entrance," then traveled to another gate which he 
referred to as the "South Gate." The Sheriff then waited at the South Gate. 
The Sheriff received Pulumbo's cell phone number and then called Pulumbo. 
The Sheriff had a cell phone conversation with Pulumbo, who told him that he 
heard things being loaded into a vehicle near a cabin owned by Perry. At some 
point, Pulumbo told the Sheriff that he knew Perry, and that he knew Perry 
owned yellow, Dewalt power tools, which he kept in the cabin. However, 
Pulumbo did not have knowledge of specific items that may have been taken by 
the alleged intruders. Pulumbo also told the Sheriff that he heard words being 
spoken by three distinct voices. 
While at the South Gate, the Sheriff saw headlights moving towards the south on 
a road that would have been inside the Aspen Hills Subdivision. 
Contemporaneously, while still speaking by cell phone. Pulumbo spoke into his 
phone and described to Sheriff Larsen what he was observing. Pulumbo said he 
could hear the vehicle leaving the cabin and see it moving south in the 
Subdivision. 
The Sheriff lost sight of the headlights he saw moving south on a road inside the 
Subdivision. The Sheriff called Greenwell on the radio, told him to leave the 
North Gate, and go back to the Round Hills Road, then to go south towards Mt. 
Pleasant to see if he could see a vehicle moving south. 
Greenwell obeyed the SherifFs orders. He drove west on Aspen Hills Road, then 
south on the Round Hills Road, where he saw taillights moving away from him. 
Greenwell matched the speed of the other vehicle with his police cruiser, locked 
his radar, then executed a traffic stop of the vehicle. 
21. Just prior to stopping the vehicle, Greenwell had picked up his radio and used the 
phrase to "go 10-60" - which interpreted means, that he picked up the radio in 
his patrol vehicle, contacted the dispatcher and said, "I'm stopping the vehicle at 
a certain location." 
22. From the moment that Greenwell arrived, none of the three people in the vehicle 
were free to go, although no one specifically told them, "you are under arrest." 
23. The Sheriff and Capt. Larsen heard GreenwelPs message in their cars. Greenwell 
provided his location over the radio. 
24. The Sheriff and Capt. Larsen traveled toward Greenweirs location. Capt. Larsen 
arrived first. When Capt. Larsen arrived he observed a dark colored Toyota Four 
Runner stopped that appeared to have been traveling southbound on 900 East in 
Mt. Pleasant. 
25. Greenwell's car was parked about one hundred feet behind the Four Runner. 
Capt. Larsen parked his car behind Greenwell's. Prior to Capt. Larsen's arrival, 
Greenwell, standing behind the open door of his police cruiser, spoke to the Four 
Runner to indicate who he was and to provide instructions. 
26. The driver's door opened and Taecia Prows ("Prows") exited the vehicle. 
Greenwell spoke again and directed Prows put her hands up over her head. 
Prows complied with Greenwell's order. Greenwell approached Prows, 
handcuffed her, then walker her across the street at 900 East where he had her sit 
down. At that time it was approximately 3:40 in the morning. 
27. Greenwell went back to his car, where Capt Larson met with him. They had a 
conversation. Next, Capt. Larsen went to the passenger side and asked the 
passenger to exit the vehicle. The vehicle door opened, and a person got out. 
Capt. Larsen later learned that the passenger was Travis Williams ("Williams"). 
28. Capt. Larsen was standing very close to Williams. Capt. Larsen saw inside the 
interior of the vehicle, and observed the handle of a large, fixed blade knife under 
the seat. 
29. Both Greenwell and Capt. Larsen also knew that there was a third person in the 
vehicle who was sitting in rear seat behind the driver's seat. 
30. Capt. Larsen spoke to Williams, told him that he planned to look for weapons 
inside the vehicle and asked, "is that ok?" Williams said "yes." Capt. Larsen 
secured Williams with handcuffs, then led him back to the front of GreenwelFs 
car and asked Williams to sit on the ground. 
31. Capt. Larsen and Greenwell then returned to the rear door, driver's side of the 
Four Runner and asked the other passenger, later identified as Daniel Wendler, to 
exit the vehicle. They placed him in handcuffs then took to GreenwelFs police 
car and asked him to also sit on the ground. 
32. When Greenwell and Capt. Larsen had returned to the vehicle, after Prows was 
secured, they could smell the odor of alcohol emanating from the interior of the 
vehicle. 
33. In the process of opening the rear door, Greenwell and Capt. Larsen observed 
tools, partially covered by a blue tarp. The tools they observed were yellow in 
color. 
34. After Williams granted Capt. Larsen consent to search the vehicle for weapons, 
the glove compartment was searched and a marijuana pipe was located. 
Additionally, the officers located a tin can containing marijuana, inside a bag 
found within the vehicle. 
35. Before Greenwell and Capt. Larsen had went to the rear driver's side door, 
Sheriff Larsen had arrived at the scene. At that time, SherifiF Larsen spoke with 
Capt. Larsen and Greenwell and said that he'd had a conversation with Polumbo. 
Sheriff Larsen described his conversation with Polumbo to Greenwell and Capt. 
Larsen, indicating to them that Polumbo specifically told him to look for tools 
that are yellow in color. 
36. Within three to five minutes after the suspects were placed in handcuffs, Capt. 
Larsen interviewed both Williams and Wendler in his patrol car after providing 
them with Miranda warnings. Williams and Wendler both accused Prows of 
participating in removing items from Perry's cabin. 
37. Eventually the three suspects were transported away. 
38. The Four RunnoiwM taken to Mt. Pleasant to the public work* yard. The yard is 
ftdlity, Th« Four RUMCT was soaxchediitiw public works y«*d 
The Court fiodi that on December 3.2003 it 3:00 am, the 
inspect'* Four Runner woe the only such vehtelc and Ughteob«crv«l by PolumboaiKl Sheriff 
Laxsen in the vicinity of Aspen Hills Subdivision. Tb»(^^kM^onMySsidMibAi^%U^of 
the Four Runner was close in timet* Polumbo and Sheriff Uram obaerving the vehicle traveling 
away from Aspen Hilla Subdivision, then being loceved by Oreenwell traveling south on the 
Round Hills Road. Finally, the Court finds that everything which occurred subsequent to the 
officer's stop of the auspeet vehicle was baaed on probable cause. 
Therefore, baaed on the above-listed findings Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby 
denied. 
DATED *i *»» .2005. JXfd^ 
JUD&E DAVID L. MOWER 
CfiRTfflCATE Of SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ,_^rday of November, 2005.1 fined a true end 
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER by First Class mail to the 
JimR. Scarth 
Attorney for Defendant 
32 East 100 South, Ste. 204 
St George, Utah 94770 
Fax: (435)628-2179 
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